Research on intertemporal behavior has emphasized trait-like variance. However, recent studies have begun to explore situational factors that affect intertemporal preference. In this study, we examined the associations between emotional primes and both behavior and brain function during intertemporal decision making. Twenty-two participants completed a dual task in which they were required to make intertemporal choices while holding an expressive face in memory. From trial-to-trial, the facial expression varied between three alternatives: (i) fearful, (ii) happy and (iii) neutral. Brain activity was recorded using functional magnetic resonance imaging for 16 participants. Behavioral data indicated that fearful (relative to happy) faces were associated with greater preference for larger but later rewards. During observation of fearful faces, greater signal change was observed in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. During subsequent decision making, the fear prime was associated with greater signal increase in structures including the posterior sector of the anterior cingulate cortex. Individual differences in this activity correlated with the magnitude of the priming effect on behavior. These findings suggest that incidental emotions affect intertemporal choice. Increased farsightedness after the fear prime may be explained by an inhibition spillover effect.
INTRODUCTION
Humans are distinct from other species in their capacity to pursue temporally distant goals. One paradigm ('delay discounting') used to investigate this capacity in laboratory settings requires people to trade-off between magnitude and immediacy of expected gains (e.g. would you prefer $25 today or $50 in 40 days?) or less frequently, of expected losses. Research on human discounting has focused on stable individual differences rather than situational factors. Researchers have compared discounting behavior among socially or clinically relevant groups of people (e.g. healthy controls vs drug users, pathological gamblers or binge eaters) (Kirby et al., 1999; Critchfield and Kollins, 2001; Petry, 2001; Dixon et al., 2003; Kirby and Petry, 2004; Weller et al., 2008; Davis et al., 2010) . This work emphasizes the trait-like component of the behavior, supported by its relative stability over long periods of time [test-retest correlation ¼ 0.71 across a 1-year span (Kirby, 2009)] .
Recently, there has been an increased interest in investigating situational factors that moderate intertemporal choice. It has been shown that appetitive stimuli increase preference for immediate rewards within the same consumption domain (Loewenstein, 1996) . For example, people are more impatient to eat desserts when exposed to the sight and smell of the desserts. Recent studies have extended this work by examining how delay discounting is affected by motivational states that are not directly related to the intertemporal alternatives that are presented to the participants (e.g. the effect of sexually arousing stimuli on intertemporal choices about money; Wilson and Daly, 2004 ; see also Li, 2008; Van den Bergh et al., 2008) . However, the neural mechanism(s) behind the priming effect of cues on discounting behavior remains an open question.
The first goal of this study was to examine whether emotional primes (in particular, happy, fearful and neutral faces) affect intertemporal decision making. We do not presume effects of briefly presented emotional faces to be identical to effects of the sustained corresponding emotion (an issue we return to in the discussion section). However, both happy and fearful faces provoke facial mimicry (e.g. Dimberg et al., 2000) , which tends to produce congruent emotion in the observer (Dimberg, 1988; Lundqvist and Dimberg, 1995; Wild et al., 2001) . Thus, if there are effects of emotional face primes on intertemporal choices, it is possible that corresponding emotional states play a mediating role. With respect to intertemporal monetary choices, any emotions elicited by faces can be classified as 'incidental emotions', as they are not linked to the anticipated outcomes (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003) .
There are several reasons to hypothesize that emotional states would impact intertemporal decision making. Within the intertemporal choice literature it has been suggested that decision making is based on the combined affect of a farsighted, analytical and emotionally 'cool' system and a temporally myopic, visceral and emotionally 'hot' system (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; McClure et al., 2004) . Accordingly, it could be that emotional arousal of any type leads to steeper discounting, through excitation of the hot system. Applying this reasoning, the arousal component of any emotion (Russell, 1979) , independent of valence, might be hypothesized to recruit greater involvement of the hot system, and correspondingly increased preference for more immediate rewards.
However, from the perspective of emotion research, a more natural prediction is that particular emotions will impact intertemporal decisions in particular ways. Consider an alternative set composed of a smaller but sooner (SS) and larger but later (LL) monetary reward. If an individual exhibits no consistent preference between the SS vs LL alternatives, the term 'indifference' or 'stochastic indifference' is generally used to characterize the lack of preference. However, this is misleading with regard to psychological processes. 'Indifference' in the fullest sense applies only to options that are seen as interchangeable (e.g. one may be fully 'indifferent' between two brands of cola that taste the same). In contrast, the SS and LL options of an 'indifference pair' are defined by at least two mismatched distinct attributes, amount and immediacy. Given that most individuals prefer more money to less money, and most individuals prefer to get money sooner rather than later, the alternatives that comprise an 'indifference pair' are each better on one dimension and worse on another. This has an important implication; anything that affects the relative importance of the amount and immediacy attributes can affect intertemporal choice. Indeed, alteration of the valuation of specific outcomes is arguably the raison d'être of emotions (Tooby and Cosmides, 2008) . Within emotion research, 'process models' examine the path by which emotions affect judgment. Bower (1981) emphasizes an indirect path; emotions, he argues, influence associative networks, which affect what memories and concepts are attended to during the judgment and decision-making process. Particularly, if decision making unfolds through generating arguments in support of each alternative (Weber et al., 2007) , emotional influence on associative networks would be expected to influence intertemporal choice, as they will alter the likelihood particular arguments will come to mind. Alternatively, 'affect as information' (Schwarz and Clore, 1983) perspectives suggest a more direct path of influence. When evaluating a prospect, the individual uses her bodily feelings (Damasio, 1994) as a source of information. If the feeling state is asymmetrical with respect to the distinct attributes of an intertemporal choice pair, intertemporal preference may be influenced. For example, suppose that for a particular decision maker, delay is conceived to imply uncertainty (the proverbial 'two in the bush'). If an emotional state elicited by a prime is active while the individual contemplates the rewards, the bodily correlate of the prime might be interpreted as an indication of riskiness of the delayed reward. The feeling elicited by, for example, a fearful face, might thereby lead the participant to conceive the delayed reward as more risky (and consequently, less attractive) than would otherwise be the case.
Yet another hypothesis proposed is that efforts at affect regulation can result in emotion-specific effects on intertemporal choice. In particular, it has been suggested that people are more likely to choose immediate rewards when in a sad mood, which has been interpreted as behavior directed toward the alleviation of negative affect (Augustine and Larsen, 2011; Lerner et al., 2011, in press ).
The second goal of this study was to identify a possible neural mechanism(s) of the emotional prime effect on discounting behavior. Research has converged upon a common set of brain regions that appear to track value during intertemporal choice tasks. These include the ventral striatum, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and medial prefrontal cortex (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Gregorios-Pippas et al., 2009; Peters and Buchel, 2009; Pine et al., 2009; Prevost et al., 2009; Sripada et al., 2011) . In addition, several studies have reported associations between brain function and intertemporal choice. The lateral prefrontal cortex and other regions implicated in cognitive control [e.g. insular cortex, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)] have been repeatedly observed to be associated with choice of LL over SS alternatives (McClure et al., 2004; Wittmann et al., 2007; Weber and Huettel, 2008; Rubia et al., 2009; Christakou et al., 2011; Luo et al., 2012) . In a recent transcranial magnetic simulation study on delay discounting, Figner et al. (2010) observed reduced preference for LL alternatives when functioning of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) was temporarily disrupted, suggesting the left dlPFC (around Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinate: x ¼ À 38, y ¼ 36, z ¼ 22) has some causal role in farsighted intertemporal decisions. If incidental emotions do affect intertemporal choice behavior, it may do so through an affect on these value tracking and (or) choice-related regions.
In this study, we used a novel dual-task paradigm in which participants were required to make intertemporal choices while maintaining different emotional faces in working memory. While our ultimate interest is in the effect of incidental emotions on decision making, we note from the outset that the relationship between perception of an emotional face and experience of an emotion is imperfect. Emotions depicted varied from trial-to-trial between fearful, happy and neutral. An adaptive intertemporal choice procedure was used (Luo et al., 2012) to create an environment where there was maximum variability in choice, thereby increasing the power to observe potential emotional priming effects. These data allowed us to assess (i) whether emotional primes affected intertemporal choices and (ii) whether any effects in behavior were related to observed changes in neural functioning. With regard to the latter, we hypothesized that the effects of emotion primes on intertemporal choice would be modulated by those regions discussed earlier, which have previously been shown to be associated with value tracking and intertemporal choice.
MATERIALS AND METHODS Participants
Twenty-two healthy volunteers participated in the study (mean age ¼ 33.6 AE 7.7 years, nine females). All participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, good in health and free from any psychological and neurological disorders. This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Southern California (USC). Participants provided written informed consent and were paid for participation. Six participants scheduled during a period of construction surrounding the imaging facility only completed the behavioral task without magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanning. One participant was excluded from the analysis because of excessive head motion during MRI scanning, resulting in 15 participants included for imaging analysis.
Pre-testing
Two procedures were performed for estimating individuals' delay discounting behavior before MRI scanning. First, participants completed a brief Monetary-Choice Questionnaire, developed by Kirby et al. (1999) . Individuals' choices were used to derive initial 'rough estimation' of subject-specific delay discounting using a simple hyperbolic discount function:
where V ¼ time discounted value (i.e. 'present value') of a delayed amount, A ¼ amount, D ¼ specified delay (in days) and k is a fit parameter (Mazur, 1987) . Second, the best-fit parameter k derived from the Kirby's questionnaire was used as a starting point for the second delay discounting task, this one utilizing an adaptive algorithm (Luo et al., 2009 ). The adaptive procedure was directed at increasing precision in determining individuals' discounting estimates. During the adaptive procedure, participants were presented with intertemporal choice alternatives (SS and LL rewards). The delay of the LL ranged from 14 to 56 days, and the delay of the SS varied from 0 to 13 days. The amounts of the LL were randomly drawn from a uniform distribution from $20 to $65. The amount of the SS was titrated throughout the task. Specifically, on each trial, if the participants chose the LL alternative, then the k parameter was adjusted downward a quarter step on a log 10 scale, so that the value of SS would be higher on the next trial. Conversely, if the participants chose the SS option, then the k parameter was adjusted upward, resulting in a lower SS on the next trial. This titration procedure continued until a criterion was reached, which was a window of eight trials where the k values did not deviate by more than two steps. The final k was calculated using the geometric mean of k values for the final eight trials of the titration procedure. This final k was used to generate an initial 'indifference point' for the subsequent intertemporal choice task in the scanner. The 'indifference point' is the k-value at which both options of the choice alternative would be, on average, equally preferred (referred as equivalence-k or 'k e ' throughout).
Scanner task
In the scanner, participants performed an individualized adaptive intertemporal choice task intermixed with different emotional primes (Figure 1 ). Each trial started with a 'þ' with 0.5-5 s variation. Then, a computer generated face (FaceGen Modeller 3.2; http://www. facegen.com) was displayed on the screen for 1-2 s. Participants were instructed to remember the facial expression of the individual. The facial expression differed from trial-to-trial between fearful, happy and neutral. After the face disappeared, choice options were presented on either side of screen, with side of the more and less immediate alternative randomized. Participants were asked to choose between these two options by pressing either left or right button on a response pad, corresponding to the side of the display on which their preferred alternative was presented. Participants were free to choose any time during presentation of choice alternatives and the text of the option turned from white to yellow after their selection. If a response was not made within 4 s, 'please respond' appeared on the bottom of the screen. After 6 s, regardless of whether participants responded or not, the alternatives were cleared from the screen indicating that an intertemporal choice could no longer be made, and the second facial expression was presented on the screen. In all cases, the second face was of the same individual as the first, but the intensity of the facial expression differed on half of the trials. Participants were asked to press the left button if the second face depicted emotion was at the same intensity as the first one, or to press the right button if it was at a different intensity level. Feedback was not given to minimize emotional responses related to task performance. However, if participants failed to respond to the second facial expression, 'no response' appeared on the screen. We will refer to the delay discounting task as the 'primary task' and the emotional expression task as the 'secondary task'. It is important to note that this secondary task was designed to force participants to hold the target expression in memory, with the goal of increasing its impact (relative to what would be observed given passive observation of the prime stimulus). The participant's accuracy also allowed us to verify engagement in the priming task. Accurate or inaccurate responses on the secondary task did not affect payment.
The delay of the LL ranged from 14 to 56 days, and the delay of the SS varied from today to 13 days. In half of trials, there was an immediate ('today') alternative and in half, both alternatives were delayed. The amount of the LL was randomly generated from $20 to $65. The SS amount on each trial was generated using a value of k e that was continually adjusted throughout the session to keep alternative pairs closely matched given the delay discounting exhibited by the participant. Subjects were given 51 trials for a single run with 17 trials for each of the three emotional prime conditions. The 51 trials were divided into 17 blocks, and each block was comprised of three different conditions in a random order. Choice alternatives within each block had the same k e . k e in this experiment was adjusted on a block-by-block basis. Specifically, k e was adjusted upward a quarter step on a log 10 scale if participants within a block chose SS options twice or more, and consequently, the relative value of the LL alternatives was increased for the next block. Conversely, within a block, if participants chose LL options twice or more, k e was adjusted downward a quarter step on a log 10 scale, resulting in an increase of relative value of SS alternatives for the next block. Otherwise, k e remained the same on the subsequent block. The procedure ensured that the SS and LL alternatives would be nearly equally preferred for all participants.
Participants completed two runs of this task separated by a structural scan (4 min), and each run was 11-min long, resulting in total 26-min running time in the scanner. Participants were instructed that one of the trials would be randomly selected at the end of the task, and that they would receive whichever option they selected for that trial (available after the indicated delay).
Task stimuli
Facial expressions were generated using FaceGen Modeller 3.2 (http:// www.facegen.com). The intensity level for emotional faces that appeared first in each run varied from 71 to 100% of maximum setting in FaceGen (mean ¼ 85.4%, s.d. ¼ 9.0%). When the target face was non-neutral (fearful or happy), the second emotional face was at the same intensity level half of time, and at 60% lower intensity level the other half of trials (e.g. a face that is 80% of 'maximal happy' during target presentation and 20% of maximal happy in test presentation). During the neutral face condition, the second expression was either again neutral, or was 60% maximal happy or 60% maximal fearful. Different faces were used across runs to avoid familiarity-related adaptation, and all faces had the same characteristics (race: European; age: 25-30 years). Subsequent to the scanner task, participants were asked to rate facial expressions they saw in the scanner task according to this instruction 'Now I want you to tell me how you felt about those facial expressions you saw in the scanner task. Facial expressions you saw at the scanner will be displayed one by one on the screen. After viewing each expression, please report: What is the intensity of each emotion as felt when you saw this facial expression (from 1 to 10), 1 means the emotion was strongly fearful, 5 means neutral, and 10 means the Fig. 1 An example of one of the trials participants encountered in the scanner. First, participants were presented with a facial expression, in this trial a fearful expression, for 1-2 s. Then, they were required to choose between SS and LL alternatives (one of which would be randomly selected for actual payout). A few second later, participants were instructed to make a judgment once the second facial expression appeared on the screen.
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emotion was strongly happy'. As a result of a programming error, two participants' post-task rating data were not recorded.
BAS/BIS scale
Participants completed the Behavioral Activation System (BAS)/ Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) (Carver and White, 1994) scale, a questionnaire that assesses individual variability in trait approach and withdrawal motivation. 
MRI acquisition

fMRI analyses
Imaging data were analyzed using fMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT) version 5.98, part of the Oxford University Centre for Functional MRI of the Brain (FMRIB) Software Library (www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). FMRI data were preprocessed using spatial smoothing (Gaussian kernel of full width at half maximum of 5 mm) and temporal smoothing with a high-pass filter (100 s cutoff) and motion correction. The preprocessed data were then submitted to a general linear model that was used to analyze the contributions of experimental factors to BOLD. All within-subject statistical analyses were performed in each subject's own image space, and then transformed to standard space before high-level analysis. Echo planar images were realigned to the anatomical images acquired within each scanning session and normalized to a standard brain using affine transformation (Jenkinson and Smith, 2001) .
Our primary analyses targeted brain signal changes (i) during presentation of the emotional prime and (ii) during intertemporal decision making. The emotional prime period was jittered with 1-2 s variation to isolate this period from decision making.
First, we identified regions differentially active as a function of prime using the F-test. This F-test consisted of three events: fear, happy and neutral prime (starting from the onset of presentation of facial stimulus and ending at when a choice was made). Then, we analyzed differences in the prime condition regressors. Seven events were added in the model: fearful prime, happy prime and neutral prime during emotional prime period (starting from the onset of presentation of prime and ending at when the face stimulus disappeared); fearful prime, happy prime and neutral prime during decision making (starting from the presentation of choice pairs and ending at when a selection was made). Events during the emotional prime period were orthogalized to events during choice period, so that common variance was attributed to the latter. An additional event (starting from the onset of presentation of the second face and ending at when the face stimulus disappeared) was added to take into account variance associated with completion of the secondary task. The goal of this analysis was to identify regions differentially associated with emotional primes during their observation, and during immediately subsequent intertemporal decision making. Thus, the following contrasts were performed: fearful vs happy, fearful vs neutral and happy vs neutral, each during the period in which the emotional prime was presented. And, fearful vs happy, fearful vs neutral and happy vs neutral, each during the period in which the intertemporal choice was made. These contrasts were thresholded using cluster detection statistics, with a height threshold of Z > 2.3 and a cluster probability of P < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons associated with whole-brain analyses (except where explicitly noted otherwise). Correlation analysis was also conducted relating individual difference in BAS/BIS with BOLD signal change difference between emotional primes.
Next, we correlated individual differences in the prime effect on behavior with neuroimaging data. This was performed in FMRIB software library by a regression analysis on the subject contrast images of any observed neural prime effects (i.e. fear > happy during emotion prime period and decision-making period, respectively) using the behavioral prime effect (i.e. LL choice difference between fear and happy prime) as the independent variable.
All the above regressors were convolved with canonical double gamma hemodynamic response function and temporal derivatives were added as well. A fixed-effect model was used for cross-run analysis (Beckmann et al., 2003) . Cross-run analysis results were input to group-level analysis using a mixed-effects model (Woolrich et al., 2004) . (2, 40) ¼ 3.371, P ¼ 0.044] according to repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 'condition' (fearful, happy and neutral) as a within-subject factor. Paired t-tests suggested that the fearful prime yielded significantly higher %LL than the happy prime [t (1,20) ¼ 2.985, P ¼ 0.007]; but neither of the emotional primes was significantly different from the neutral condition (P ¼ 0.311 and P ¼ 0.053 for fearful vs neutral and happy vs neutral, respectively).
RESULTS
Prime effect on choice
Alternatively, we analyzed data with logistic hierarchical models using the R lmer function of the lme4 library to take into account trial-by-trial variances in individuals' choices. A base model included a fixed-effects predictor explaining within-subject variance in choice behavior, and a random-effects participant term that captures consistent individual differences in choice. Specific contrasts were added to the base model, and it suggested the same pattern: preference for LL rewards was significantly greater during fear prime than happy prime (Z ¼ 1.984, P ¼ 0.0472); neither of the emotional primes was significantly different from the neutral condition (P ¼ 0.529 and P ¼ 0.284 for fearful vs neutral and happy vs neutral, respectively).
Next, we re-examined the association between prime and choice, excluding trials in which an error was made on the secondary task, as errors on the secondary task suggested that the primes had not been maintained in working memory. (Figure 2) . The main effect of emotional prime on %LL was significant [F (2,40) ¼ 4.492, P ¼ 0.017] according to repeated measures ANOVA with 'condition' (fearful, happy and neutral) as a within-subject factor. Paired t-tests suggested that the fearful prime yielded significantly higher %LL than the happy prime [t (1,20) ¼ 2.985, P ¼ 0.007]; but neither of the emotional primes was significantly different from the neutral condition (P ¼ 0.311 and P ¼ 0.053 for fearful vs neutral and happy vs neutral, respectively).
The same logistic hierarchical model as described earlier was applied to data again as an alternative method and indicated the same data pattern: preference for LL alternatives was significantly higher during fear prime than during happy prime (Z ¼ 2.318, P ¼ 0.0204), but neither of the emotional prime conditions was significantly different from the neutral prime (P ¼ 0.568 and P ¼ 0.09 for fearful vs neutral and happy vs neutral, respectively).
Accuracy and reaction time (RT) on secondary task
The percentage of times participants made accurate judgment on secondary task was 70.87% (s.d. ¼ 14.19), 74.37% (s.d. ¼ 14.65) and 76.47% (s.d. ¼ 18.81) for happy, fearful and neutral prime, respectively. There was no significant difference in accuracy across conditions (P ¼ 0.280). Mean RT on the secondary task (starting at the time the second face appeared on the screen and ending when subjects responded) was calculated as well. There was no significant difference in RT across conditions (P ¼ 0.250).
Neuroimaging results
Main effect of prime F-test was performed to identify brain regions differentially active as a function of emotional face primes. With a priori threshold (Z > 2.3, P < 0.05 cluster correction), no significant activation was observed. However, it is worth noting that with voxel threshold relaxed to Z ¼ 1.6, and cluster level correction maintained at P < 0.05, significant activation was observed in brain regions including the dorsal ACC, right dlPFC (BA 9), right parietal cortex, precentral/postcentral gyrus and PCC/precuneus cortex (Supplementary Figure S1 and Supplementary Table S1 ).
Emotional prime period: contrast map of fear > happy faces
Relative to happy faces, fearful faces recruited greater activation in the right dlPFC (BA 9), precentral/postcentral gyrus and left parietal cortex (Figure 3 ; Table 1 ). The reverse contrast did not indicate any regions in which signal was greater when participants viewed happy (relative to fearful) faces. Individual brain signal change in the right dlPFC cluster for the fear > happy contrast trended toward a positive association with individual variability in BIS score (Spearman's rho ¼ 0.473, P ¼ 0.075). Covariate analysis relating individual difference in the size of behavioral prime effect (%LL_fear-%LL_happy) to brain activity difference between fear and happy during the emotional prime period (within the single mask of clusters that showed significant activation for fear > happy as identified in Figure 3 below) did not reveal any significant associations.
Decision-making period: neural prime effect on intertemporal choice During intertemporal decision making, the fear (relative to happy) prime was associated with greater signal change in the ACC, supplementary motor area (SMA), bilateral precentral/postcentral gyrus, PCC/precuneus cortex and left parietal cortex (Figure 4 ; Table 1 ). No significant differences were observed for the 'happy > fear' contrast during the choice period.
Behavioral prime effect vs neural prime effect
We conducted covariate analysis again relating individual difference in the size of behavioral prime effect (%LL_fear-%LL_happy) to the prime effect on fMRI signal (fear > happy during decision-making period, within the single mask of clusters that showed a significant effect, as identified in Figure 4 ). This analysis revealed a significant positive association between individual differences in the behavioral prime effect and neural prime effect in the posterior sector of ACC and SMA ( Figure 5 ; Table 1) .
Post-task rating results
Participants reported that they felt emotionally happy when they saw happy faces which appeared first in the scanner task (mean ¼ 8.00, s.d. 
DISCUSSION
In this study, we found that fearful and happy primes were differentiated in both their effect on intertemporal choice, and in their effect on brain activity during intertemporal decision making. Specifically, the fear prime condition (relative to the happy prime) was associated with greater preference for delayed rewards. While viewing a fearful face (relative to a happy face), greater brain signal change was observed in the right dlPFC, precentral/postcentral gyrus and left parietal cortex. During subsequent intertemporal decision making, the fear prime condition (relative to the happy prime) was associated with greater activity in the ACC, SMA, PCC/precuneus cortex, bilateral precentral/postcentral gyrus and left parietal cortex. Moreover, we observed that neural signal in the dorsal ACC/SMA during fearful vs happy primes in intertemporal choice predicted individual behavioral difference in LL preference between these conditions. Exposure to emotional faces cannot, of course, be presumed to elicit the emotions they depict. Subjects were asked to report the emotions elicited by the faces, and their responses indicated that the faces elicited the congruent emotion. However, the specific self-report measurement was problematic, and should be considered a limitation. Participants reported the emotion elicited by faces by indicating a number on a likert scale anchored with the endpoints 'strongly fearful' and 'strongly happy', with 'neutral' anchored as the midpoint. This approach does not allow us to measure other emotions elicited by the faces (e.g. a fearful face could provoke an alternative emotion, such as surprise). Emotion primes and intertemporal choice SCAN (2014) In addition, the approach does not allow for any independent assessment of arousal elicited by emotions. It is likely that relative to happy faces, fearful faces elicited a response that differed in arousal and in valence (e.g. see Balconi and Lucchiari, 2008) . Thus, the present data are not well suited for disentangling the effects of valence and arousal components with regard to their impact on intertemporal choice. Emotional primes introduced in our study are incidental to decisions (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003) . Nevertheless, previous studies suggested that incidental emotions influence decision making (Bodenhausen, 1993; Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003; Winkielman et al., 2005) . We are aware of no previous study that has directly tested the effect of incidental emotions (or more precisely, emotional primes) on intertemporal choices at both the behavioral and neural level. However, related studies suggest that exogenous cues such as sexual stimuli, a highly regarded brand logo and appetizing desserts increased preference for immediate rewards (Wilson and Daly, 2004; Li, 2008; Van den Bergh et al., 2008; Murawski et al., 2012) . In addition to research examining the effects of appetitive cues on intertemporal choice, aversive 'incidental' factors such as bladder pressure has also been considered. In Tuk et al. (2011) , the authors observed that people who had a higher level of bladder pressure (requiring a higher degree of maintaining inhibitory control) showed greater preference for observed that individual differences in this effect were positively associated with trait inhibition responses, as measured by the BIS. Thus, the differential effect fear and happy faces had on our participants' intertemporal choices might be associated with distinct approach and withdrawal motivation systems (Schneirla, 1959; Lang et al., 1990; Gray, 1994) . It should be noted, however, that the term 'inhibition' is used in a variety of distinct ways within psychology and neuroscience (see Aron, 2007 for discussion) . Here, we use the term 'inhibition' to designate responses, including emotional responses, that suppress reward-seeking behavior (as shown most dramatically in the characteristic 'freezing' response of many mammals). The term 'withdrawal response' might be greatly overlapping. In either case, the relevance of this response to intertemporal choice rests on the possibility that the SS and LL rewards are asymmetrically affected. Alternatively, our results might be related to the interaction between emotional prime effects and cognition. We introduced emotional primes by asking participants to hold them in memory. Prior studies of delay discounting suggested that preference for LL decreases when participants are put under working memory load (Hinson et al., 2003) . However, working memory load was ostensibly similar across different conditions in our study, and we did not observe differences in the secondary task performance (i.e. accuracy score) between the happy and fear prime conditions. Moreover, %LL differences between happy and fear prime conditions were not correlated with secondary task performance differences between the two conditions (P ¼ 0.327).
Our results are not consistent with affect regulation findings in which negative emotion was associated with increased preference for SS alternatives (Augustine and Larsen, 2011; Lerner et al., 2011, in press ). Affect state was primed on a trial-by-trial basis in our study, as opposed to prolonged affect induction (the entire test session) used in previous studies (Augustine and Larsen, 2011; Lerner et al., 2011, in press) . It is plausible that regulatory response to affect would not be recruited in this study, given the transience of any emotion induced by observation of expressive faces. This data are also not explained by cold-hot dual system account of intertemporal choice (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; McClure et al., 2004) , which arguably predicts that any type of emotional arousal (i.e. happy or fearful primes) would increase the engagement of the hot system, resulting in steeper discounting.
Unlike previous studies that demonstrated prime effects on discounting, in this study we also observed prime effects on brain function simultaneous to behavior. First, we found that right dlPFC and parietal cortex were more responsive to fearful faces than happy faces. Veling et al. (2011) reported that fearful faces slowed down participants' motor responses toward appetizing food rewards for restrained eaters and suggested that fear can trigger withdrawal signals that affect response toward unrelated temptations. Consistent with this finding, the right dlPFC has been implicated in mediating withdrawal behavior (Davidson et al., 1990; Davidson and Irwin, 1999; d'Alfonso et al., 2000; Davidson, 2002; Camprodon et al., 2007; Shackman et al., 2009; Berkman and Lieberman, 2010) . We also observed a trend toward a positive correlation between BOLD signal change in the right dlPFC and individual sensitivity of behavioral withdrawal response measured by the BIS, which provides some support for the interpretation that the right dlPFC activation generated by fearful primes was relevant to withdrawal response. However, this interpretation is speculative, particularly in the absence of any phasic measurement of motivation tendency. Second, we observed that fear primes (relative to happiness primes) was associated with a greater signal change in the ACC, SMA, PCC and bilateral precentral/postcentral gyrus, precuneous cortex and parietal cortex during intertemporal choice, and that the neural prime signal in the posterior ACC and SMA was linked to individual variance in the observed prime effect on behavior. SMA has been implicated in preparation of intentional action (Libet et al., 1983) . The dorsal sector of ACC (BA 24) has been implicated in detecting conflict (Botvinick et al., 2004) . Neuroimaging studies in delay discounting reported greater activation in the ACC when LL alternatives were selected (Luo et al., 2012) or when delay discounting was reduced (Peters and Büchel, 2010) , and when value differences between alternatives were smaller (greater task difficulty/conflict) (Pine et al., 2009) . Another suggested functional role of posterior ACC is to detect internal states such as pain (especially affective aspect of pain) (Peyron et al., 2000; Rainville, 2002; Eisenberger and Liebermen, 2004) . It might be the case that withdrawal signals (representing in the right dlPFC) led to increased recruitment of the posterior part of the ACC during immediately subsequent decision making, through inhibition spillover. On this hypothesis, greater activation in the posterior ACC indicated greater inhibition spillover, and led to a greater increase in farsighted choice. However, any specific functional interpretation is, at present, speculative.
In conclusion, our data suggest that emotional primes of fear and happiness differentially affect intertemporal choice. The increased preference for LL rewards after viewing fearful faces (relative to happy faces) was associated with neural activity that we interpret as a relative increase in withdrawal-related signaling produced by the fear prime and carried over to decision making. The posterior ACC might be a potential neural correlate of inhibition spillover.
